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Michael Doi* The Judicial Independence of
Canadian Forces General Court
Martials: An Analysis of the
Supreme Court of Canada
Judgment in R. v. Genereux
"Necessity has no law."
St. Augustine (354-430)
- Soliloquiorum. Animae ad Deum [c.410], ch. 5
I. Introduction
In R. v. Genereux, the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the structure
of a Canadian Forces General Court Martial and found it to incorporate
features which reasonably called its judicial independence into question.1
This was held to violate the rights of accused military personnel to a fair
trial under sub-section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
* Special thanks to Ford Wong and Edward Tsai for their assistance in preparing this article.
1. R. v. Genereux (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 110 (S.C.C.), [hereinafter Genereux]. The accused,
a Corporal in the Canadian Forces, was charged with several narcotics-related offenses
contrary to s.4(2) of the Narcotic ControlAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1 [punishable under former
s.120(1) (now s. 130(1)) of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5], and one count of
desertion contrary to former s.78(1) [now s.88(1)] of the National Defence Act. He was
convicted before a Canadian Forces General Court Martial, but on appeal to the Court Martial
Appeal Court argued that his right to trial by an independent tribunal had been infringed,
contrary to s.11 (d) of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter Charter],
s. 11 (d). [for details outlining the applicability of the Charter to Canadian Forces General Court
Martial proceedings, see infra, note 33]. A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that
then-existing Canadian Forces statutory provisions governing the convening of Court Martials
were inappropriate to guarantee these tribunals sufficient independence from the executive
branch of government. An identical appeal was raised in R. v. Forster (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th)
169 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Forster], which questioned the independence of Presiding Officers
at a General Court Martial. In Forster, the Court adopted its reasoning in Genereux to quash
previous statutory provisions which structured an insufficient degree ofjudicial independence
for Court Martial tribunals from the Governor-in-Council.
Recent amendments to Canadian Forces statutory provisions appear to rectify this problem
ofjudicial independence. However, these new provisos were not before the Supreme Court of
Canada in Genereux, and are here referred to solely for purposes of completeness. For details
of the amendments, see infra, note 53.
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Freedoms.2 In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Canada
questioned the legitimacy of Canadian Forces provisions which structure
a judicial process governing service personnel as separate and distinct
members from the rest of the general population. The Court also reviewed
the validity of traditional military values, which contrast with civilian
attitudes of contemporary Canadian society.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court could not agree upon the extent to
which military requirements should be considered in determining the
constitutional legitimacy of Court Martial tribunals.3 The resulting divi-
sion of opinion among the Justices was indicative of the controversial
nature of military judicial proceedings which are intended to provide
command authorities with a means of instituting disciplinary actions.
This disciplinary process follows traditional military doctrine and en-
courages operational efficiency by compromising constitutional prin-
ciples of juristic fairness.4 Despite having considered the contrasting
nature between disciplinary and constitutional concerns over military
judicial proceedings, the Court in Genereux failed to clearly define the
2. It was further held that such a breach could not be justified under the terms of s.1 of the
Charter. A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found that the General Court Martial's
then-existing structure embodied features which reasonably questioned its judicial indepen-
dence. The Supreme Court added that the features were not necessary to attain either military
discipline or military justice, and thus could not be found to have impaired the appellant's
s.l 1(d) Charter rights "as little as possible" as prescribed by the s.1 proportionality test in
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
3. There are three judgments in the Genereux case:
(i) Lamer, C.J.C. (Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, and Iacobucci J.J. concurring);
(ii) Stevenson J. (La Forest, and McLachlin JJ. concurring in part); and
(iii) L'Heureux-Dube J. (dissenting).
4. For example, the current theoretical framework of Canadian Forces evidentiary rules
surrounding the issue of self-incrimination is consistent with the belief that a strict level of
discipline must be maintained to ensure operational efficiency. Provisions under the Military
Rules of Evidence [Appendix XVII of Vol. II The Queen's Regulations and Orders for the
Canadian Forces, 1968 Revision, Amendment List No. 83, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 19
February 1990)] fail to provide a defence mechanism for an accused against the compulsion
of making self-incriminating confessions before trial to persons of higher military rank. The
universal requirement that every service person answer questions of a superior derives its
statutory authority from s.73 of the NDA [supra, note 1] which states:
73. Every person who disobeys a lawful command of a superior officer is guilty of an
offence and on conviction is liable to imprisonment for life or to less punishment.
Consequently, an accused's right under s.13 of the Charter [supra, note 1] to freedom from
self-incrimination may be breached by virtue of statutory provisions governing the conduct of
military personnel. In contrast to military disciplinary considerations, Canadian social prin-
ciples of justice are founded on the premise that fundamental Constitutional rights and
freedoms should be preserved as indicators ofinherent civil liberties, as a matter of paramount
importance despite the competition of othervalues recognized by the legal system. Forareview
of this argument, see Russell, "The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1983), 61 Can. Bar Rev. 30.
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role and priorities of Canadian military tribunals. Consequently, the
judicial and disciplinary roles of Canadian Forces General Court Martials
remain largely undefined, which obfuscates a determination of their
constitutional legitimacy within the operational context of the Canadian
Forces.
The following analysis of Genereux will examine the function of
military tribunals, and the requirements that these tribunals must meet to
legitimately exercise their authority. The discussion will begin by re-
viewing the disciplinary foundation of Canadian military law, and the
nature of military tribunals which contemplate the military context of the
Canadian Forces in applying military law to maintain self-discipline and
organizationally-imposed disciplinary standards. Following this back-
ground analysis, s. 11(d) of the Charter will be examined to derive the
standard of judicial independence formulated by the majority judgment
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Genereux.5 Ultimately, a determina-
tion of this issue will require a conclusion to be drawn regarding the extent
to which the Canadian Forces should differ from civilian society on the
basis of its military context, and the necessary limits that Canadian
society may impose on the legal rights of service personnel.
II. The Military Context of the Canadian Forces
1. The Disciplinary Foundation of Canadian Military Law
In 1868, Canada established its first codification of military law regulat-
ing matters of national defence.6 This statutory framework governed
Canadian troops as a legally distinct and segregated entity from the
civilian community. It was believed that this scheme would effectively
inculcate a strict disciplinary standard within the services by indicting
5. The standard of militaryjudicial independence in Genereux was established by applying the
generic model of judicial independence outlined by Mr. Justice Le Dain in Valente v. R., see
infra, note 30.
6. Section 91(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, grants Parliament
the exclusive power to regulate military affairs in Canada. Originally, this power was
manifested in three Canadian statutes: (i) The Militia Act, S.C. 1868, c.40, as later amended by
S.C. 1947, c.21; (ii) The NavalServicesAct, S.C. 194445, c. 23; and (iii) The Royal Canadian
AirForceAct, R.S.C. 1940, c.15. Following World War II, Parliament reviewed all legislation
applicable to the unified tri-service armed forces in Canada, and in 1950 enacted the National
Defence Act, [now cited as R.S.C, 1985, c. N-4, hereinafter referred to as the NDA], which
remains the primary statutory basis of the Canadian Forces. This enactment ended any direct
application of U.K. military law in Canada.
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military personnel found in breach of military statutes, or subordinate
regulations. 7
This beginning led to the development of modem Canadian military
law which incorporates a Code of Service Discipline to maintain a
traditionally stringent disciplinary standard for regulating the conduct
and deportment of Canadian Forces members.8 A military judicial
structure was also created to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over service
personnel. It is headed by the Judge Advocate General of the Canadian
7. Conventional wisdom generally upholds the importance of strict discipline as an opera-
tional requirement for any military organization. This theory is rooted in early British law with
the Ordinance ofRichard I(A.D. 1190), when the importance of maintaining orderon the long
voyage to the Holy Lands during the Crusades was proclaimed and entrenched. [Ordinance of
Richard I- A.D. 1190, from Grose, History of the English Army, vol. 2,63, in Wm. Winthrop,
Military Law andPrecedents (New York: Amo Press, 1979) 903.] Centuries later, the Mutiny
Act (1662), 3 Charles II, c.3., restated the need to sustain combat effectiveness within the
King's Army by providing legal sanctions that severely discouraged desertion or other acts in
defiance of the command hierarchy. Today, Canadian military law preserves these traditional
objectives, per Canadian Forces Leader's Handbook on Performance Guidance (Ottawa:
Department of National Defence, 1984) 2-5 at para. 7. Also see: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd.)
J.B. Fay "Canadian Military Criminal Law: Examination of Military Justice" (1975), 23
Chitty's L.J. 120 at 123-124.
8. The NDA [supra, note 6] provides a Code of Service Discipline, which outlines the standard
of conduct and deportment for members of the Canadian Forces Regular component, as well
as Militia and Reserve personnel. [Code of Service Discipline, per NDA Second Division,
s.55-211 incl.] Accompanying regulations are found in The Queen's Regulations and Orders
for the Canadian Forces, 1968 Revision, Amendment List No. 83, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
19 February 1990) [hereinafter referred to as QR&O's], detailing the major policy regimes for
the Canadian Forces. Although the NDA may apply to service-dependants, spies, or
civilian-employees who submitto this jurisdiction, [NDA, s. 55(4)(c)], this paper will study the
impact of military law on the service personnel of the Canadian Forces. For an organizational
breakdown of the Canadian Forces in its contemporary form, see NDA, Pts. I and II of the First
Division.
238 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Forces, whose primary mandate is the prosecution of criminal-type
charges against armed forces personnel.9
By its nature as a professional military organization, the Canadian
Forces is inherently required to maintain optimal task performance
within combat units and combat-support services. 0 As Chief Justice
Lamer states:
To maintain the Armed Forces in a state of readiness, the military must be
in a position to enforce internal discipline effectively and efficiently.
Breaches of military discipline mustbe dealt with speedily and, frequently,
punished more severely than would be the case if a civilian engaged in such
conduct."
This view reflects traditional military doctrine which regards disci-
pline as a critical element of command and control. In turn, command
efficiency promotes combat effectiveness, and largely determines the
9. For an examination of the appointment procedures, and official exercise of powers mandate
governing the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Forces [hereinafter
referred to as the JAG], see NDA [supra, note 6], s. 9 and s. 10.
A majority of military offenses prosecuted by the JAG are uniquely associated with the
military context, and do not fall within the scope of civilian criminal jurisdiction. Sections 63
to 119 of the NDA prescribe the various offenses which constitute "an act, conduct, disorder,
or neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline," which are subject to punishment
prescribed under s.125 of the NDA. [The same offenses are again listed in art. 103 of the Code
of Service Discipline, as found in ch. 103 of QR&O's, with corresponding punishments listed
in art. 104(2) of the Code and ch. 104 of QR&O's. For an example of a military offence and
corresponding punishment, consider the offence of failing to properly shine one's shoes for
morning inspection under s.119(1) of the NDA, which states as a military offence:
Any act, conduct, disorder or neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline is an
offence and every person convicted thereof is liable to dismissal with disgrace from Her
Majesty's service or to less punishment. [emphasis added]
An appropriate punishment metedout to an irregular offender would typically involve [at the
discretion of the commanding officer or his delegated authority, per s. 121(2) oftheNDA] extra
drill on the parade square the following morning. Within the civilian context, such an offence
and punishment arrangement would simply be inconceivable.
10. This view was adopted by Ritchie J., speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada, in MacKay v. R., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370 [hereinafter MacKay] at 400, where he states:
The National Defence Act ... encompasses the rules of discipline necessary to the
maintenance of morale and efficiency among troops in training. In my view these are
some of the factors which make it apparent that a separate code of discipline adminis-
tered within the services is an essential ingredient of service life.
11. Genereux, supra, note 1 at 135.
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success of a military action. 12 For this reason, the statutory entrenchment
and exercise of rigid disciplinary standards arguably constitutes a legiti-
mate application of military authority. 3 Military tribunals are further
justified in dealing with the particular disciplinary requirements of the
Canadian Forces by nature of their familiarity with the structure of the
armed forces. In contrast, any recourse to ordinary courts would likely
yield less contextual appreciation of disciplinary mandates by civilian
decision-makers lacking expertise with the Canadian military establish-
ment.'4 It is added that military tribunals are best able to comprehend the
seriousness of a military offence within its context, which may be
reflected by the availability of significant punishments to bolster deter-
12. For a review, see W.J. Lawson, "Canadian Military Law" (1951), 24 Can. Bar R. 240, at
242-243. Also, see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. by Anatol Rapoport (Markham: Penguin
Books Canada Ltd., 1987) Book Three, chs. II - VII; Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and ed.
by Samuel B. Griffith (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1971) Part IV. at 85; and Norman
F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Futura Publications, 1985)
Part I.
13. In R. v. Hauser, [1978] 1 F.C. 233, at 235, Cattanach J. summarized this idea:
Military law and its administration in armed forces has subsisted since time immemorial
and it has subsisted in Canada since the first Canadian military force was organized one
year after Confederation. ... [The ordinary law that applies to all citizens also applies
to members of the armed forces but by joining the armedforces those members subject
themselves to additional legal liabilities, disabilities and rights, that is to say to
Canadian military law. [emphasis added]
14. Officers presiding over a military tribunal are particularly sensitive to the exigencies of
military service, given their experience and training in the military environment. Conse-
quently, Presiding Officers are uniquely well-suited to dispense a fair and just result at a
military trial of an accused, in the context of enforcing disciplinary standards which are
necessarily enforced by the military. For an analysis, see Lieutenant-Colonel R.A. McDonald
(JAG), "The Trail of Discipline: The Historical Roots of Canadian Military Law" (1985), 1
Canadian Forces JAG J. 1; Wing Commander J.H. Hollies (JAG), "Courts Martial in the
Canadian Forces" (1959-60), 2 Crim. L.Q. 67; and Brigadier W.J. Lawson, JAG "Canadian
Military Law" (1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 3.
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rence and underscore the value placed upon discipline by command
authorities.15
Having reviewed the nature of Canadian Forces operational require-
ments and disciplinary provisions which govern the conduct of service
personnel, it is further submitted that Officers and Non-Commissioned
Members of the Canadian Forces should be held accountable to a
different set of rules and regulations which set them apart from the
mainstream of contemporary Canadian society. 16 This equates to an
understanding that enrolment in the Canadian Forces necessarily in-
volves some relinquishment of personal rights and freedoms to preserve
the requisite disciplinary agenda of the armed forces. 7
15. To illustrate the degree of severity with which discipline is treated within the Canadian
Forces, it is emphasized that whereas capital punishment has been abolished from the Canadian
Criminal Code [R.S.C. 1990, c. C-46], the NDA cites thirty-four wartime offenses which may
be punishable by execution. These offenses typically include:
i. Misconduct in the Presence of the Enemy
ii. Mutiny
iii. Offenses Related to National Security, or Treason
iv. Spying for the Enemy; etc.
For details, see Part V (ss. 63, 64,65,66,68,69,70), and s. 175 NDA, [supra, note 6]. The NDA
also provides for life imprisonment for twenty-five service-related offenses, including:
i. Theft
ii. Striking or Offering Violence to a Superior Officer
iii. Offenses Related to Committing Violence Against an Ally
iv. Desertion; etc.
For details, see ss. 67, 71,72, 73, 74,78, 88, 96, 97, 100 NDA.
16. In contrast to military disciplinary principles, Canadian social principles of justice are
founded on the premise that fundamental Constitutional rights and freedoms be preserved as
indicators of inherent civil liberties, as a matter of paramount importance despite the
competition of other values recognized by the legal system. For a review of leading literature
on this point, see Peter H. Russell, "A Democratic Approach to Civil Liberties" (1969), 19
U.Toronto L.J. 109; Donald V. Smiley, "The Case Against the Canadian Charter of Human
Rights" (1969), 2 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 277; R.A. MacDonald, "Postscript and Prelude-the
Jurisprudenceof the Charter" (1982),4S.C.L.R. 321; PeterH. Russell, "The Political Purposes
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1983), 61 Can. Bar Rev. 30.
17. For details on the clash between military and civilian juristic principles, see generally
Brigadier-General (Ret'd) D. Broadbent, "Military Society: Change or Decay? Part 1 (1982),
11 Canadian Defence Quarterly (4th) 24; and "Part I' 12 Canadian Defence Quarterly (1st)
28; and P. Kasurak, "Civilianization and the Military Ethos" (1982), 25 Canadian Public
Administration 108. For a comparative Australian perspective, see J.D. Fine, 'The Ascription
of Jurisdiction to Courts-Martial" (1990), 20 Western Australian L.R. 34 at 44. For commen-
tary on the military necessity for expeditious justice, see House of Commons Standing
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, April 25, 1985 at 21.
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2. The Nature of Canadian Forces Military Tribunals
Historically, disciplinary hearings before a military tribunal generally did
not incorporate the juristic formalities of a trial. 8 With the advent of the
National Defence Act in 1950, informal disciplinary hearings were
codified as Summary Trials. These tribunals were given limited statutory
guidelines, which largely relied upon the prudent exercise of discretion
by Presiding Officers. Formalistic Court Martial proceedings, which
largely mirror civilian trials, were retained in the NDA to handle more
significant service offences.
(i) The Summary Trial
The current statutory format of a Summary Trial proceeding is detailed
in ch. 108 of QR&O's.19 A Summary Trial reviews complaints of
relatively minor offenses which have allegedly been committed by a
member of the Canadian Forces. The trial is presided by a single officer,
who exercises wide-discretionary powers to ensure a balanced execution
of judicial fairness and efficiency. 20 Trials are short in duration, involve
minimal juristic formalities, and may trigger sentences dispensing rela-
tively minor forms of punishment.21
This system grants an accused service person certain procedural rights
which promulgate a sense of justice. The arrangement also provides an
effective means of reminding an accused of the seriousness of poor
18. Matters of relatively minor consequence were immediately dealt with by junior leaders,
to efficiently maintain morale and unit cohesion and conformity. Only the more serious
allegations of wrongdoing, such as desertion or theft, were reviewed and decided at formal
court martial proceedings.
19. Ch. 108 of the Code of Service Discipline [supra, note 9] details the procedures for
conducting a Summary Trial. For comprehensive analysis, see Fay, supra, note 7 at ch. IV,
"Pre-Summary Trial Problems".
20. Art. 108.03(8). Note (D) (i), (iii), and (iv) of QR&O's [supra, note 8] clearly states that in
the exercise of his/her discretion, the Presiding Officer adjudicating a Summary Trial should
consider:
a. the nature of the offence;
b. the interest of justice; and
c. the interest of the accused.
Moreover, every Officer is generally required to grant fair treatment to any service personnel
under his command. For an analysis of such responsibilities accompanying an officer, see
Junior Officer's Handbook (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1980) ch. 1.
21. Per Code of Service Discipline [supra, note 9], ss. 108.53, 108.33, 108.47, 108.48
(108.52), 108.49, 108.50, aPresiding Officeris empowered to grant punishment ranging from
a mere caution, to a maximum of thirty-days incarceration, a fine up to $200, extra work and
drill, stoppage of leave privileges, or confinement to ship or barracks. Punishments in excess
of this may be imposed, subject to approval by a superior authority (Code of Service Discipline
s. 108.40).
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disciplinary conduct. It further defines the degree to which persons in
command authority will enforce various rules, regulations, and respon-
sibilities, to impose a strict disciplinary standard within his/her unit,
without invoking the costs and highly significant ramifications of a full
Court Martial.22
(ii) The Court Martial
Court Martials deal with breaches of a more serious nature, and are vested
with weighty accompanying powers of punishment. 2 In general, Court
Martial rules and procedures mirror their civilian judicial counterparts by
entertaining remarks, evidence, and examinations from the Prosecution
and Defence Counsel in an adversarial setting. Given the seriousness and
significance of Court Martials, these proceedings are well regulated by
22. Statutory provisions governing Court Martials are generally found in chs. 111 -114 in
QR&O's, supra, note 8.
23. Part VIII arts.176-194 NDA [supra, note 6] outline the punishments which are at the
disposal of the Presiding Officer(s). Art.176 specifically deals with incarceration. Further
details on military detention are found at Appendix XVI QR&O's [supra, note 8], with chs. 5
and 6 detailing the harsh disciplinary measures employed.
The prospect of incarceration inside the Canadian Forces Prison Facility attached to
Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Edmonton is an extremely compelling factor for an accused to
avoid committing a serious offence, orto plead for leniency afterhaving committed an offence.
Unlike the routine at civilian jails, military prisoners are maintained on a highly regimented
schedule of corporal punishment, including corrective drill and forced-labotir. Consistent with
this philosophy, inmates have no right to receive visitors (Appendix XVI "Regulations for
Service Prisons andDetention Barracks"NDA, art. 4.15), an inmateis required toperform eight
hours of "remedial training" per day (Sundays excepted) (Table A to art. 5.02), and an inmate
who is cited for bad conduct may have food privileges denied except for fourteen ounces of
bread per day and unrestricted quantities of water (arts. 6.13-No. 1 Diet, 6.14-No. 2 Diet).
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statutory provisions which minimize the exercise ofjudicial discretion to
ensure universal fairness. 4
(ii) Application of Military Tribunals
A military tribunal may be convened by the Minister of National Defence,
or other authorities as he/she may appoint to manage this convening
responsibility.Y Generally, a Commanding Officer is empowered to
convene a military hearing at his/her discretion. Following an investiga-
24. For a breakdown ofthe types and procedures of Court Martials employed by the Canadian
Forces, see chs. 111, 113 QR&O's [supra, note 8]. Given the limited scope of this paper, the
four different types of Court Martials will be considered under the generic term of "Court
Martial". The reader should nevertheless be cognizant of the fact that the specific category of
Court Martial discussed in Genereux was the General Court Martial (for details, see arts.
111.01 - 111.23 QR&O's). Notably, the use of the Special General Court Martial and the
Standing Court Martial is limited, due to their narrow scope of application. For details see
ss.55(4), 154, 155 NDA [supra, note 6]. Trial procedure provisions for all Court Martials are
detailed in ch. 112, s. 2 (arts. 112.05 - 112.051), s. 5 (arts. 112.24 - 112.31), s. 6 (arts. 112.28
- 112.22) QR&O's, and generally follow the procedures employed in civilian courtrooms. For
example, an official transcript is provided of the proceedings [arts. 112.66, 112.17], parallel
rules of evidence are employed [art. 112.68 - 112.79 QR&O's; Appendix XVII Military Rules
of Evidence, QR&O's], the accused is entitled to legal counsel [art. 111.60], the adversarial
nature of a criminal courtroom is preserved with examinations of witnesses by the prosecution
and defence counsel [art. 112.05(8),(12),(13)], motions are entertained by the bench [arts.
112.06112.605 QR&O's, s. 168(4) NDA], counsel forthe parties and the bench are practising
lawyers, and the prosecution is held responsible for establishing a case against the accused
service person, beyond a reasonable doubt (Rule 17, Appendix XVII Military Rules of
Evidence, QR&O's; Rules 9, 10, Division 11). Provisions dealing with Court Martial findings
and sentences are outlined in ch 114 QR&O's.
25. S. 143(1) NDA [supra, note 61, art. 111.05 QR&O's [supra, note 8].
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tion into the charges, and a review of the evidence adduced, a Command-
ing Officer may decide to prosecute an accused service person.
26
Normally, military authorities prefer to handle disciplinary matters by
employing traditional methods of command and control, and avoid the
formality of Summary Trials.27 However, Summary Trials become a
necessary procedure in instances of wrongdoing where the accused
service person potentially faces more significant punishment falling
short of the level necessitating the convening of a Court Martial.
This brief review of the nature of Canadian Forces military tribunals
reveals that these forums are designed to expeditiously dispense with
breaches of conduct or deportment committed by service personnel.
Pursuant to s. 120 NDA, a military tribunal is responsible for efficiently
bringing a matter to trial, establishing whether the accused had commit-
ted the alleged offence, and imposing an appropriate penalty.2 8 This
26. Before charging an accused with an offence, a formal investigation is conducted by an
Investigating Officer to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to justify the laying
of a charge. [QR&O"s, supra, note 8, art.107.03] Later, a Charge Report and Charge Sheet
may be prepared when the first formal charge is laid against the accused. [See QR&O's, art.
106.04-09, Section 2.] A subsequent investigation may be instituted to delve further into the
circumstances of the case, and further buttress the case for the prosecution.
An Investigating Officer is generally appointed from a current pool of commissioned
officers or senior non-commissioned members who are serving with the accused's unit or
formation. [QR&O's, art.107.05] An officer or senior non-commissioned member from
outside the accused's unit may be ordered to conduct the investigation. However, factors of
cost/efficiency reserve this provision only for cases where the accused faces serious charges
before a Court Martial. In the case of Summary Trial offenses, it is common practice to detail
an officer or non-commissioned member from the accused's unit to conduct the investigation.
This fact may lead to a reasonable apprehension that an Investigating Officer does not begin
his inquiries with an open and objective mind.
Generally, an Investigating Officer has little or no legal training, and is professionally
ill-equipped to proficiently deal with the techniques of undertaking a police-styled investiga-
tion. QR&O's gives little guidance as to the methodology of properly conducting an investi-
gation. Instead, QR&O's art. 107.05(2) gives unreasonably heavy emphasis on the Investigat-
ing Officer's ingenuity to determine and exercise proper procedures:
(2) The investigation may be made in such a manner as seems to the person conducting
the investigation to be appropriate in the circumstances. [emphasis added]
This practice also raises the spectre of bias entering into the investigation process.
27. For example, within the Land Combat-Arms (ie. Infantry, Armour, and Artillery classi-
fications), senior non-commissioned officers (ie. Sergeant, Warrant Officer) routinely adopt
the posture of verbally issuing corrective orders at lower ranks who marginally exceed
tolerance levels of insubordination. Immediate corrections are meted out, and the generally
intimidating hierarchial rank structure usually ends any immediate command difficulties. This
avoids the consuming process of investigating an allegation of wrongdoing, issuing necessary
paperwork, and convening a military tribunal for relatively minor offenses.
28. A synopsis of the objectives and procedures of every Canadian Forces military tribunal is
set out in the First Division (Rules 1 - 21, Appendix XVII, Military Rules of Evidence,
QR&O's).
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statutorily endorsed practice underscores the clear intent of Parliament to
structure a means for military officials to efficiently prosecute disciplin-
ary matters, under circumstances where the stringent lifestyle of Cana-
dian Forces personnel demands an equally demanding legal system to
dispense justice in a manner deemed fair by those persons accustomed to
such a regimented career.29 What must next be considered is the role of
the Charter in establishing standards of judicial independence, in light of
the disciplinary agenda of the Canadian Forces.
IM. A Charter Analysis of Judicial Impartiality and Independence
In addition to reviewing Court Martial tribunals on the basis of their
disciplinary disposition, the Supreme Court of Canada in Genereux
considered Court Martials in light of the Canadian Charter ofRights and
Freedoms, which has established caselaw parameters for judicial norms
of impartiality and independence. From the perspective of administering
justice, conformity with the Charter by military tribunals is integral to
ensure that the Canadian military judiciary retains a high degree of
respect amongst service personnel who must abide by judgments which
ultimately govern their conduct and deportment.
1. Subsection 11(d) of the Charter
The landmark decision which established standards ofjudicial impartial-
ity and independence was set by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Valente, where the Court reviewed the legitimacy of Provincial Court
(Criminal Division) benches under s. 11(d) of the Charter.0 After
considering the tenure of provincial court judges, the method by which
their salaries and pensions were fixed, and the extent to which they were
dependent on the discretion of the executive branch of government for
certain advantages and benefits, the Supreme Court formulated atri-partite
test to determine the impartiality and independence of a judicial tribunal
within the meaning of s. 11 (d) of the Charter.
In his judgment, Mr. Justice Le Dan distinguished impartiality from
independence by noting that these individual doctrines remain distinct,
despite their close conceptual association. Impartiality was held to mean
29. Former Assistant Judge Advocate General to Maritime Command, Colonel DesRouches,
was quoted as saying, "[Military law] may be severe but it is knowingly severe. [Service
personnel] know if they get involved in certain things they are going to get thumped." Halifax
Chronicle Herald, February 27, 1985, cited in Andrew D. Heard, "Military Law and the
Charter of Rights" (1988), 11 Dalhousie L.J. 514 at 530.
30. Valente v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 [hereinafter Valente].
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"the state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and
the parties in a particular case."31 In contrast, independence was deemed
to refer to the objective status of thejudiciary in relation to other Canadian
institutions, particularly to the executive branch of government.3 2
This analysis was adopted in Genereuxby the Supreme Court of Canada,
which reviewed the characteristics of military tribunals to determine that
members of the Canadian Forces who preside over General Court Martials
fail to remain sufficiently independent from the Governor in Council to pass
the scrutiny of judicial review under s.1 1(d) of the Charter.33 In its exami-
nation, the Court in Genereux followed the analysis described by Le Dain J.
in Valente to assess thejudicial independence of Presiding Officers under the
following three criteria: security of tenure, financial independence, and
institutional independence.
2. The Impartiality of Military Tribunals
Subsection 11 (d) of the Charter guarantees that any person charged with
an offence has the right:
"to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal." 4 [emphasis
added]
As Le Dain J. pointed out, the concept of impartiality under subsection
11 (d) guarantees the right of an accused to have his/her matter decided
before a tribunal free of judicial bias. A tribunal is charged with the
responsibility of rendering a judgment based solely on the merits of the
31. Ibid., at 685.
32. Ibid. For an analysis of the independence of tribunals, see W.R. Lederman, "The
Independence of the Judiciary" (1956) 34 Can. Bar. Rev. 769; Sir Guy Green, "The Rationale
and Some Aspects of Judicial Independence" (1985) 59 A.L.J. 135.
33. Writingforthemajority of the Courtin Genereux [supra, note 1 at 125-126], Chief Justice
Lamer indicated that provisions under the Charter were applicable to the proceedings of a
General Court Martial by virtue of the judgment in R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541,
[hereinafter Wigglesworth]. There, Wilson J. held for the majority that a concern was subject
to Charterreview if it was related to a matter ofa public nature intended to promote public order
and welfare within a public sphere of activity, or if it involved the imposition of true penal
consequences in redress of a wrong done to society at large. [Wigglesworth, 560-561.] In
adopting this reasoning, Lamer C.J.C. found that the Code of Service Discipline provided in
the NDA went beyond merely regulating military conduct which impeached discipline and
command, as it served a public function by punishing conduct of military personnel which
posed a threat to public order. [QR&O's arts. 102.23,103.60,103.60,103.62,] Thus, the Court
was able to consider the question of whether the accused's constitutional right to an impartial
and independent trial under s.1 l(d) of the Charter had been infringed.
34. Supra, note 2.
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case before it." In the context of a military tribunal, the Presiding Officer
is required to be free of influence from outside parties, such as superiors
or Commanding Officers who may hold a concerned interest in the
outcome of the trial. In view of the disposition of military officers towards
strict enforcement of discipline over military personnel, and the close
association between the Judge Advocate and the Prosecution, the ability
of a Presiding Officer to independently and objectively decide a case
appears suspect.
The model of impartiality developed by Chief Justice Lamer in
Genereux is based on the definition provided by Le Dain J. in Valente,
where he described impartiality as:
a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and the
parties in a particular case. The word "impartial" ... connotes absence of
bias, actual or perceived.36
While the Appellant in Genereux did not directly question the impar-
tiality of the Court Martial by which he was tried, and did not suggest that
the tribunal was biased against him, the issue of impartiality deserves
attention in the context of analyzing the credibility of the Canadian Forces
judicial structure. By way of example, a Commanding Officer may
appear to exert undue influence in the proceedings of a service prosecu-
tion. Given discretionary powers to authorize an investigation, and a
perceived disposition derived from the responsibilities of command to
eradicate disciplinary problems by prosecuting an accused on limited
evidence, it would not be unreasonable to find that a Commanding
Officer may appear to over employ his/her prosecutorial discretion and
35. Le Dain J., speaking on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, noted in his
decision in Valente:
Impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues,
and the parties in a particular case. The word "impartial" ... connotes absence of bias,
actual or perceived. [emphasis added]
Valente, supra, note 30 at 685.
The question of bias was also dealt with by the Court Martial Appeal Court in Schick v. R.,
[1987] C.M.A.C. 265. In that case, Mr. Justice Cavanagh affirmed the view (at p. 266) that:
the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one held by reasonable and right minded
persons applying themselves to the question and obtaining therein the required
information.... [T]he key operative word is reasonable and it must be based on
information.
36. Valente, supra, note 30 at 685.
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fuel bias against an accused.37 Similarly, the apprehension of bias may
further be developed through the exercise of authority by a Commanding
Officer to lay charges after reviewing an Investigation Report.38 A
Commanding Officer may also recommend the appropriate type of Court
37. After receiving a complaint, a Commanding Officer decides who shall conduct the
investigation into the allegations. Generally, this person is a member of the same unit as the
Commanding Officer, and falls under his/her command or control. After the appointment, the
Investigating Officeris briefed on the situation by the Commanding Officer or a representative.
In all probability, any bias demonstrated by the Commanding Officer in stating the case against
the accused is highly persuasive to the Investigating Officer, because of the prevailing military
command component which subordinates that person. Further, periodic evaluation reports
(which strongly determine one's career advancement potential) are reviewed by Commanding
Officers, as are applications for career enhancement training programs, and personal requests
(ie. leave or posting preferences). All of these factors when viewed together plausibly suggest
that an Investigating Officer may be swayed by his/her Commanding Officer's bias prior to
initiating the investigation. It is noted that officers overwhelmingly execute their duties with
a high level of care and professionalism. [Remarks to the Officers' Mess by LCol. K.L Bartels,
Commanding Officer, The Governor General's Horse Guards. While some critics questions
the ability or motivation of officers to perform their duties, (see Colonel B.S. MacDonald
"Issues of Command and Control" in "The White Paper, The Army Reserve, and Army Reform
- 1987 - 2002" (1988) 17(4) Canadian Defence Quarterly 9 at 20), it is submitted that this
pessimistic perspective is not commonly shared throughout the Canadian Forces.] Neverthe-
less, any realistic apprehenion of bias must be reviewed to assess the legitimacy of military
tribunals, and the administration of military discipline and justice.
38. Per QR&O's, supra, note 8, art. 107.12(2)(b). Note (A) to this provision amplifies the
apprehension of bias by indicating that a Commanding Officer must prosecute all charges as
quickly as possible, thus encouraging ardent prosecutions in the exercise of this authority. In
addition, a Commanding Officer may submit a Synopsis to his next Superior Officer. This
provides an evidentiary summary of the case against the accused from which the next Superior
Officer will formulate the decision of whether to dismiss the charges against the accused, or
allow him/her to stand trial before a higher ranking tribunal. The Synopsis presents only that
evidence which establishes a case for the prosecution of the charge. [See Fay, supra, note 7 at
195.] Any statement made by the accused will-be recorded and attached to the Synopsis as a
separate document, to be given no evidentiary consideration by the higher authority. [QR&O's,
art. 109.03(2)(b), (c).] As well, a Synopsis may contain hearsay testimony in support of the
charges, although such hearsay evidence is not admissible at Summary Trial or any other
military judicial proceeding. Given this severe breach of customary evidentiary law and its
significantly prejudicial value, bias against an accused is likely to occur. For details, see Col.
H.G. Oliver "Canadian Military Law" 23 Chitty's L.J. 109 at 113.
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Martial proceeding to be executed39 , and file a letter to his/her superior
officer detailing the past conduct of the accused with a brief account of
the accused's service history. The impact of these submissions will vary,
although their prejudicial value is apparent in situations where such
documents may indicate an intent to convict the accused for disciplinary
purposes.4 0 In such instances, it is unlikely that this meaning would go
unnoticed by a Presiding Officer, who would review the accused's file
before and during the course of a trial.4'
In consideration of the Canadian Forces as a highly trained military
organization designed for efficient deployment under severely adverse
tactical conditions, it is submitted that the harshly regimented Canadian
Forces disciplinary structure is appropriate to maintain a necessarily high
degree of operational readiness and proficiency.42 In her dissent, Madame
Justice L'Heureux-Dube argued this view by encouraging the use of a
highly contextual study to assess the military exigencies of a Canadian
Forces Court Martial.43 Whereas Chief Justice Lamer placed emphasis in
39. The choice of Court Martial directly impacts on the maximum punishment that the tribunal
is empowered to prescribe. A General Court Martial may impose any of the service punish-
ments which are detailed in the specific statutory provisions of the NDA [per QR&O's art.
111.17; ch 104 arts. 104.02 - 104.12 (inclusive)], although it may not dispense minor
corrections such as a caution. [QR&O's art. 11.17] This reflects the understanding that an
accused standing trial before a Court Martial cannot expect to be granted leniency, or avoid
penal consequences. The powers of punishment for a Disciplinary Court Martial are limited to
two years imprisonment, and it may not try a commissioned officer of or above the rank of
Major [per QR&O's art. 111.36(a)]. Notably, this tribunal also may not pass a minor
punishment [QR&O's art. 11 1.36(b)l. A Standing Court Martial holds the same powers of
punishment as the Disciplinary Court Martial, and was designed to try cases dealing with
accused service personnel stationed abroad [S.C. 1966-67 c. 96, s. 42; QR&O's art. 113.5; s.
154NDA]. Rarelyappliedis theSpecial General CourtMartial whichonly tries civilians, where
powers of punishment are outlined at s. 55, 125(1)(a),(b),(d) and (k) NDA; and QR&O's art.
104.02.
40. For details, see QR&O's arts. 109.02- 109.05.
41. QR&O's art. 111.50 (a),(b), and (d).
42. For an official description of this operational mandate of the Canadian Forces, see:
Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: 1987 White Paper on Defence,
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987).
43. See Genereux, supra, note 1 at 152-153. For an analysis of the contextual approach as a
doctrine of interpreting the Charter (or any other constitutional provision), see Re B.C. Motor
VehiclesAct, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; Reference re Public Service Employee RelationsAct (Alta.),
[198711 S.C.R. 313; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326;
R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. (1991), 130 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.); Kindler v. Canada (Minister
of Justice) (1991), 129 N.R. 81 (S.C.C.). This review of caselaw indicates that a constitutional
right will undergo transformation in different circumstances, and consequently will adopt a
different meaning consistent with each situation in which it is applied. This requires a
contextual background analysis when making a determination as to the appropriateness of any
given Charter application, and the importance or purpose attached to the constitutional right
in accordance with public policy values which are directly related to the specific circumstances
of the case.
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his judgment on the judicial nature of these military tribunals,4 Madame
Justice L'Heureux-Dube's dissent underscored the paramount impor-
tance of accommodating military requirements imposed on service
tribunals, which she described as a fair and necessary disciplinary
mechanism of the Canadian Forces.45
After reviewing relevant caselaw, Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube
concluded that the nature of military tribunals does not breach the right
of an accused service person to an impartial trial under section 11 (d) of
the Charter.41 This opinion was supported by Mr. Justice McIntyre, in the
pre-Charter decision of MacKay v. R.:
Since very early times it has been recognized in England and Western
European countries which have passed their legal traditional and prin-
ciples to North America that the special situation created by the presence
in society of an armed military force, taken with the special need for the
maintenance of efficiency and discipline in that force, has made it neces-
sary to develop a separate body of law which has become knows as military
law.... [This body of law has included ... a judicial role for the officers
44. Itis significant to note that a Judge Advocate is statutorily required to maintain an impartial
disposition prior and during a trial by Court Martial. [QR&O's, supra, note 8, art. 112.(1).] As
well, every Judge Advocate swears an oath, at the start of each trial, to perform his/her duties
without partiality or favour.[QR&O's arts. 112.15, 112.16.]
45. The need to consider the military context of the Canadian Forces is emphasized by s.1 1 (f)
of the Charterwhich provides an exception to the right to a trial by jury where an offence under
military law is to be tried before a military tribunal. This illustrates that legislative intent had
contemplated a separate system of military justice in drafting the provisions of the Charter,
which underscores the need to account for the special circumstances that arise in relation to a
military tribunal.
It is with this understanding that the judgment of Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube is
emphasized, for its argument that the facts of a case must be considered in their context at the
outset of a trial. This practice would ensure that a court fully appreciates the contextual realities
of a case when evaluating its merits against the Charter. In R. v. Keegstra, [ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 697
at 733, Chief Justice Dickson (as he then was) supported the view that this kind of contextual
analysis was best left for a s. 1 Charter review (seeking to allow a breach of a Charter right on
the grounds that such a breach was demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, per
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.) which would follow a ruling on the immediate Charter
provision being weighed by a court. In disagreement, Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube's
theory states a rational need to determine the appropriateness of a Charter provision in light
of its contextual setting. The impact of such a perspective in the majority ruling in Genereux
would have been for the Supreme Court to acknowledge greater understanding and empathy
to the role of military tribunals, which were. designed to accommodate the prementioned
operational objectives of the Canadian Forces.
46. In R. andArcher v. White, [1956] S.C.R. 154, the Supreme Court of Canada conducted an
analysis of the possibility of the appearance of bias arising from the involvement of a
Commanding Officer in the prosecution of a service offence. The majority held that a
Commanding Officer must act in the best interest of the Canadian Forces' general mandate to
ensure operational effectiveness, while balancing this objective with an exercise of fair and
reasonable treatment in disciplinary actions.
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of the military force concerned [which] arose frompractical necessity and,
in my view, must continue for the same reason.47 [emphasis added]
In his dissent in MacKay, Chief Justice Laskin speaking for himself
and Estey J. disagreed with McIntyre J. and argued that the exigencies of
the Canadian Forces failed to justify the practice of holding military
personnel to a higher standard of conduct than civilians in Canadian
society: "I cannot conceive that there can be in the country two such
disparate ways of trying offenses against the ordinary law, depending on
whether the accused is a member of the armed forces or not."48 Notably,
however, this perspective appears to not fully consider the rationale
behind Parliament's enactment of the National Defence Act, which was
to maintain a stringent disciplinary nexus within the armed forces as a
valid federal objective pursuant to s. 91(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
In his judgment accompanying Genereux, Mr. Justice Stevenson
agreed with L'Heureux-Dube J. and decided that a Canadian Forces
tribunal may adjudicate from the disposition of enforcing strict disciplin-
ary standards that are institutionalized in the Canadian Forces by opera-
tion of its military nature. This view is also shared by a number of authors
writing on the demands of military law, which is structured to accommo-
date the stringent disciplinary curriculum of the Canadian Forces.49
In conclusion, a contextual analysis of military tribunals may deter-
mine that any real or apparent judicial bias is justifiably valid, in
consideration of the military nature and special disciplinary requirements
which arise from the operation of the Canadian Forces. This kind of
legitimacy requires a number of procedural safeguards to ensure that a
minimum standard is set for the protection of an accused's rights. Such
mechanisms would serve to secure an apprehension of legitimacy and
fairness within the Canadian Forces, and the general civilian public.
While a direct analysis of the specific nature of procedural safeguards is
beyond the scope of this paper, it is parenthetically suggested that
procedures observed at Summary Trial exceed the parameters of any
legitimate application of military justice, even with a considerable
amount of weight attached to the contextual considerations of discipline
and efficiency which remain paramount factors in any military institu-
tion. Procedures employed at Court Martials appear more consistent with
the letter and spirit of fairness provided in s. 11 (d) of the Charter.
47. Supra, note 10 at 402-404.
48. Ibid., at 381-382.
49. See Fay, supra, note 7 at 123; Heard, supra, note 29 at 514; and generally David J. Corry,
"Military Law Under the Charter" (1986), 24 Osgoode Hall L. Rev. 67.
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3. Independence of the General Court Martial
The unanimous judgment of Le Dain J. in Valente stipulated three criteria
which must be fulfilled to establish that an adjudicatory bench constitutes
a validly independent tribunal under s. I I(d) of the Charter. This analysis
was adopted by all three Supreme Court judgments in Genereux which
evaluated the independence of a General Court Martial.50 The first two
criteria, security of tenure and financial independence, are evaluated
according to a Presiding Officer's personal connection with the military
executive body of Canadian government (ie. the Department of National
Defence). The last criterion, institutional independence, refers to the
overall independence of Canadian Forces military tribunals from the
executive branch of Canadian government, namely the Department of
National Defence.
(i) Security of Tenure
Le Dain J. identified security of tenure as existing when:
the judge [is] removable only for cause, and that cause be subject to
independent review and determination by a process at which the judge
affected is afforded a full opportunity to be heard. The essence of security
of tenure for the purposes of s. 11 (d) is a tenure, whether until an age of
retirement, for a fixed term, or for a specific adjudicative task, that is secure
50. In her dissent, Justice L'Heureux-Dube strongly opposed the application of Mr. Justice Le
Dain's three criteria from Valente to the factual scenario in Genereux. Claiming that the criteria
could not find application to military tribunals which remain categorically distinct from other
tribunals by nature of their unique requirements and purpose, L'Heureux-Dube J. quoted from
Le Dain J. as follows:
The legislative and constitutional provisions in Canadian governing matters which bear
on thejudicial independence of tribunals trying persons charged with an offence exhibit
a great range and variety. The essential conditions of judicial independence for
purposes of s. 11 (d) must bear some reasonable relationship to that variety. [emphasis
added]
[Valente, supra, note 30 at 692-693.]
L'Heureux-Dube J. recognized that the process of evaluating the judicial independence of a
Provincial Court Judge (as in Valente), is significantly different from the evaluation of a
General Court Martial commissioned under the authority of the NDA. This difference arises
due to the substantial contextual differences which exist between the two institutions. In her
opinion, an application of Le Dain's principles of judicial independence may not offer a
rational standard for evaluating the constitutional legitimacy of certain tribunals. Notably,
despite having recognized this fact, Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube did provide analysis
based on the principles detailed in Valente, in order for her dissent to contrast the decisions of
Lamer C.J.C. and Stevenson J. on their merits.
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against interference by the executive or other appointing authority in a
discretionary or arbitrary manner."1
In his majority judgment in Genereux, Lamer C.J.C. held that a Judge
Advocate sitting on the bench at a General Court Martial (as where the
Appellant was tried) fails to hold sufficient security of tenure to satisfy
this requirement.5 2 It is important to note that all types of Court Martial
and Summary Trials temporarily employ Presiding Officers to oversee
the proceedings. Consequently, all forms of military tribunals completely
fail to satisfy the requirement for security of tenure under conditions
where a Judge Advocate's ability to retain his status as a Presiding Officer
is contingent upon a series of temporary appointments.
At the time when this case was being considered by the courts, a Judge
Advocate at a General Court Martial was appointed from the division of
Chief Judge Advocates of the office of the Judge Advocate General. The
Judge Advocate General was empowered with the authority to appoint a
Judge Advocate to a General Court Martial, generally on the recommen-
dation of the Chief Judge Advocate.53 Lamer C.J.C. found that this
appointment procedure did not independently guarantee sufficient secu-
rity of tenure for a Judge Advocate, as the Judge Advocate General forms
51. Valente, supra, note 30 at 698.
This criteria conforms with the generally perceived uniform standards of judicial indepen-
dence found under ss. 99(1) and (2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 which states:
99(1) Subject to subsection two of this section, the Judges of the Superior Courts shall
hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the Governor General on
Address of the Senate and House of Commons.
(2) A Judge of a Superior Court, whether appointed before or after the coming into
force of this section, shall cease to hold office upon attaining the age of seventy-five
years, or upon the coming into force of this section if at that time he has already attained
that age.
For comparative analysis, see s.4 and 5(4) of the Provincial Courts Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 398,
and Courts of Justice Act, 1984, 1984 (Ont.), c.1 1.
52. Genereux, supra, note 1 at 142.
53. For an analysis, see Colonel H.G. Oliver "Canadian Military Law" (1975),23 Chitty'sL.J.
109 at 116. Recent amendments to QR&O's which came into force on January 22, 1991,
subsequent to the trial in Genereux, correct the problems related to ajudge advocate's security
of tenure. Per s.4.09 QR&O's, any officer who may act as judge advocate at a General Court
Martial is first appointed as a military trial judge for a period of two to four years. Under
s. 111.22 QR&O's, the Chief Military Trial Judge, and not the Judge Advocate General, has
formal authority to appoint ajudge advocate at a General Court Martial. These provisions were
not before the Supreme Court of Canada in Genereux, and are included here for purposes of
completeness.
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part of the executive from which he/she is held responsible for supervis-
ing all Canadian Forces prosecutions.5 4
In addition to this finding, Chief Justice Lamer referred in Genereux
to the fact that at the time of the Appellant's trial, a Judge Advocate was
appointed to the bench periodically whenever a trial arose in the course
of events. It was therefore conceivable that a Judge Advocate's ability to
return to the bench hinged on the kinds of opinion rendered at trial, or the
conviction record attained in the course of his/her performance as a
Presiding Officer. In the opinion of Lamer C.J.C., this process wouldlead
a reasonable person to entertain an apprehension that a Judge Advocate
had been chosen for a particular trial because he/she had proven to not
disappoint the executive's interests in convicting an accused. As a result,
Lamer C.J.C. held that the criterion of security of tenure was again
infringed:
Nothing ... suggestis] thatjudge advocates in fact are influenced by career
concerns in the discharge of their adjudicative duties. ... [However] any
system of military tribunals which does not banish such apprehensions
will be defective in terms of s.l1(d). At the very least, therefore, the
essential condition of security of tenure, in this context, requires security
from interference by the executive for afixed period of time. An officer's
position as 'military judge should not, during a certain period of time,
depend on the discretion of the executive. 5 [emphasis added]
Stevenson J. agreed with Chief Justice Lamer, adding that providing
security of tenure for a specific Court Martial is insufficient to satisfy the
requirement for security of tenure under s. 11 (d) of the Charter.56 Lamer
C.J.C. pursued this view of tenure for the Court Martial system, stressing
that security of judicial tenure must extend over the course of time in
which a Judge Advocate would be eligible to be called to the military
bench.57 This beliefrecognizes that Judge Advocates operate on an ad hoc
basis, and must feel confident in expressing their opinions without
fearing consequences which would hinder their ability to preside in the
future, or otherwise negatively impact their career. In his judgment, Mr.
Justice Stevenson took this argument to its logical extension by realisti-
cally stating that an apprehension of undue influence from the executive
54. To underscore this alliance with the executive, itis noted that the Judge Advocate General
reports on the administration of military justice directly to the Minister of National Defence,
and on other matters of military law to the Deputy Minister of National Defence. [s. 9 NDA,
supra, note 6.]
55. Genereux, supra, note 1 at 142-143. For a discussion on the appropriate length of time for
aJudgeAdvocate to enjoy tenure, seeR. v. Ingebrigtson (1990), 61 C.C.C.(3d) 541 at 555-556.
56. Genereux, supra, note 1 at 167. For details, see Valente, supra, note 30 at Part IV of the
judgment of Le Dain J. p. 694 -704.
57. Genereux, supra, note 1 at 142-144.
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may inevitably arise when a Judge Advocate seeks reappointment or
other career advancement within the office of the Judge Advocate
General, or the legal branch of the Canadian Forces. Under these
conditions, it would necessarily follow that the best interests of the Judge
Advocate would not insignificantly hinge upon his/her performance as a
military judge based upon evaluation by the executive (ie. Judge Advocate
General), who would largely determine any future career opportunity.58
L'Heureux-Dube J. addressed this issue in her dissent, by indicating
that the ad hoc nature of convening a Court Martial will legitimize the
granting of security of tenure on a "specific adjudicative task" basis as
contemplated by Le Dain J. in Valente.59 Since the NDA clearly provides
for interim Court Martials to be held whenever a matter arises, and the
Constitution Act, 1867 empowers the executive to appoint the judiciary,
L'Heureux-Dube J. found that Canadian legislation recognizes the legiti-
mate entity of Court Martials as individual occurrences which are to be
singularly convened in the course of events. This excludes an interpreta-
tion that Court Martials are part of a "recurring affair", or a continuing
institution in their own right. Consequently, she concluded that ad hoc
Court Martials constitute an anomaly to the general pattern of civilian
tribunal operations. Therefore, L'Heureux-Dube J. decided that the
executive was free to grant Judge Advocates specific tenure which
expired when a military tribunal adjourned. 60
In her dissent, Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube also indicated that
procedural safeguards existed to guarantee tenure of a Judge Advocate.61
In her opinion, this provided:
58. Ibid., at 167-168.
59. Valente, supra, note 30 at 698.
60. Genereux, supra, note 1 at 159-160.
61. QR&O's [supra, note 8] art. 112.64(2) states:
(2) If a judge advocate has been appointed and is for any cause unable to attend, the
president shall adjourn the court and report the circumstances to the convening
authority. The convening authority may authorize the court to stand adjourned until the
judge advocate is able to attend. If the judge advocate is unable to attend or if the
convening authority considers delay to be inexpedient, the convening authority may:
(a) if the court is a General Court Martial
(i) request the Judge Advocate General to appoint another judge
advocate and, after the Judge Advocate General has appointed
the other judge advocate, direct the trial to proceed, or
(ii) dissolve the court
Thus, once appointed, a Judge Advocate is effectively granted complete security of tenure,
absent grounds for removal for cause. For analysis, see Schick v. R. (1987), 4 C.M.A.R. 540
at 548-55 1.
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sufficient insulation to the judge advocate to perform his or her duty
because it means that, to interfere, the convening authority or other
member of the executive would have to act unlawfully.62
A contextually sensitive analysis of the procedure for appointing
Judge Advocates favours the view adopted by Madame Justice
L'Heureux-Dube, which responds to the need for an efficient means of
convening Court Martials to grapple with the inconsistent and unpredict-
able caseload of the Canadian Forces. In his judgment, Stevenson J.
suggested that the only way to ideally achieve security of judicial tenure
would be to institute a professional military judiciary." However, he
immediately acknowledged that cost factors would fail to justify such a
mechanism for the Canadian Forces, which exists as a relatively
under-resourced institution with limited capacity. ,Thus, it is submitted
that criticism of the appointment process of Judge Advocates, in the face
of clear legislative intent by Parliament to institute such proceedings, is
unrealistic and unwarranted.6'
Although the Supreme Court discussed the attributes of appointing
Judge Advocates in great detail, mention of the appointment of the other
members of the Canadian Forces who compose a Court Martial tribunal
was omitted.65 In this regard, itis submitted that the practice of appointing
non-legal officers to preside over a Court Martial does not invoke a
conflict based on tenure, for the reasons of legislative contemplation
offered by L'Heureux-Dube J. in her dissent. The possibility for bias may
be greater when authorizing senior officers to determine the outcome of
a disciplinary proceeding, in light of their engrained disposition towards
a harsh disciplinary response to service offenses. However, the likelihood
of such participation in a Court Martial affecting their careers is marginal,
given their limited opportunity to sit on a tribunal and the relatively minor
consequence that such activity has in relation to the wide scope of their
62. Genereux, supra, note 1 at 161.
63. Ibid. at 168.
64. Amendments to QR&O's, of January 22, 1991, reinforce this view by securing the tenure
of Judge Advocates for a statutory period of two to four years. [QR&O's, supra, note 8, art.
4.09] As well, provisions have shifted the authority for appointing Judge Advocates from the
Judge Advocate General to the Chief Judge Advocate, which marginalizes any link between
the executive and the military judiciary. [QR&O's art. 111.22].
65. The composition of a Court Martial varies, depending on the type of Court Martial being
convened. A Court Martial generally consists of one JAG Presiding Officer who imparts
knowledge of substantive and procedural law. The rest of the bench is normally composed of
non-legal senior officers, who are tasked to the bench on an ad hoc basis with the duty of
determining questions of fact. For details, see supra, note 24.
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normal duties and responsibilities .66 With this understanding, it is submit-
ted that Presiding Officers at Court Martials enjoy a sufficiently degree
of secured tenure that assures a level of impartiality under s. 11 (d) of the
Charter and operates to fairly rebut any reasonable apprehension of
undue executive influence.
(ii) Financial Security
The second condition of the Valente test for judicial independence under
s. 1 (d) of the Charter is financial security, which indicates that "the right
to salary and pension should be established by law and not be subject to
arbitrary interference by the executive in a manner that could affect
judicial independence." 67 This proviso seeks to ensure that a right to
salary or pension is not contingent upon grace or favour towards or from
the executive.
Under s.35 NDA, Presiding Officers are not compensated for their
participation on military tribunals, over and above their regular salaries
and allowances which are prescribed by Treasury Board rates. This
practice significantly reduces the applicability of the financial security
criterion devised by Le Dain J. in Valente to evaluate judicial indepen-
dence from the executive branch of Canadian government. It also
reinforces the primary contention of the dissent in Genereux by
L'Heureux-DubeJ., by demonstrating that the Valente testis inapplicable
to cases dealing with the independence of military tribunals in light of the
uniquely anomalous nature of the Canadian Forces.
66. Over 98 per cent of all military prosecutions are dealt with by Summary Trial, which
significantly reduces the number of Court MartiaIs to be convened. [see A.D. Heard, supra,
note 29.] This trend is accounted for by the fact that a Court Martial is granted greater powers
of punishment than that of a Presiding Officer at Summary Trial, and has a general disposition
to more strongly punish an offender of military law in light of the severity surrounding such
a disciplinary occasion. [QR&O's, art. 108.03(8) Note 2.] Thus, an accused is unlikely to opt
for a Court Martial, for fear of invoking a harsher punishment and alienating him/herself of the
opportunity to appeal forleniency before arelatively informal and sympathetic SummaryTrial.
67. Valente, supra, note 30 at 704. This theory of financial security follows s. 100 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 which holds:
100. The Salaries, Allowances, and Pensions of the Judges of the Superior, District,
and County Courts ... and of the Admiralty Courts in Cases where the Judges thereof
are for the Time being paid by Salary, shall be fixed and provided by the Parliament of
Canada.
Support is similarly found with s.34(l) of the Provincial Courts Act, and s.87(1) of the Courts
of Justice Act, 1984 (in tandem with s.2 of Regulation 811 of the Revised Regulations of
Ontario, and with recommendations from the Ontario Provincial Courts Committee) which
secures a judge's salary for the duration he/she sits on the bench. [Supra, note 51].
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Chief Justice Lamer argued in Genereux that a Presiding Officer's
annual performance evaluation report filed by a superior officer could
"potentially reflect his superior's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with his
conduct at a court martial. '' 61 On this basis, he found that the process of
career promotion to a higher rank based on performance evaluation
reports gave the executive a means to potentially reward or punish a
Presiding Officer for his judgments or opinions expressed at a Court
Martial, contrary to s.l1(d) of the Charter.69 Stevenson J. shared this
opinion, noting that "there was nothing to prevent those who made
decisions in relation to salaries and promotions from taking into consid-
eration the outcome of a court martial. '70
Unfortunately, this reasoning fails to account for the fact that a
Presiding Officer's salary is significantly determined by a multiplicity of
factors beyond one's rank, such as time served, location of service-posting,
and other considerations. 71 Thus, command discretion to promote an
officer is sufficiently broad-based to avoid an apprehension of judicial
interference by the executive.72 Le Dain J. addressed this issue in Valente,
when he discounted the effect of the executive holding marginal control
over discretionary benefits or allowances:
Although it may be theoretically preferable thatjudicial salaries should be
fixed by the legislature rather than the executive government ... I do not
think that [this] feature should be regarded as essential to the financial
security that may be reasonably perceived as sufficient for independence
under s. 11 (d) of the Charter. ... The essential point, in my opinion, is that
the right to salary of a [judge] is established by law, that there is no way
in which the executive could interfere with that right in a manner to affect
the independence of the individual judge.73
Given this reasoning, it is difficult to establish that aperson would hold
a reasonable apprehension that the executive could effectively employ
this device and violate the independence of a Presiding Officer in breach
of s.1l(d) of the Charter.
68. Genereux, supra, note 1 at 144.
69. The salary of a member of the Canadian Forces is determined in part by the rank he/she
holds, pursuant to QR&O's [supra, note 8] art. 204.218. In Genereux [supra, note 1 at 145],
Lamer C.J.C. added that his remarks were not meant to suggest that the executive actively
sought to influence the outcome of a Court Martial, but rather were intended to illustrate the
grounds upon which an apprehension of undue influence could reasonably be drawn to
impeach the independence of a military tribunal under s.1 l(d) of the Charter.
70. Genereu, supra, note 1 at 168-169.
71. For details, see Canadian Forces Administrative Orders, Volume III (Financial), NDA
[supra, note 6] ch. 203; 204; 205.
72. Genereux, supra, note 1 at 161.
73. Valente, supra, note 30 at 706.
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(iii) Institutional Independence
The third condition advocated by Le Dain J. in Valente was institutional
independence, which he described as a requirement that a tribunal hold
a degree of control over administrative matters "bearing directly on the
exercise of its judicial function."74 This involved such things as judicial
control over the assignment ofjudges, sittings of the court and court lists,
"as well as matters of allocation of court-rooms and direction of the
administrative staff engaged in carrying out these functions [which have]
generally been regarded as the essential or minimal requirement for
institutional or collective independence.
75
Lamer C.J.C. made a number of observations in his majority judgment
in Genereux which support the theory that Presiding Officers lack a
sufficient degree of institutional independence. In particular, he noted
that the entire process of prosecuting a charge against an accused
appeared to have too close an association with the executive, which
allowed for an unreasonably high degree of involvement by superior
commanding officers in the proceedings of a Court Martial.76 This, he
found, reasonably casted doubts as to the independence of a Presiding
Officer under s.11 (d) of the Charter. In agreeing with Lamer C.J.C. on
this issue, Mr. Justice Stevenson indicated that the concept of institutional
independence was difficult to apply in this case because of an inherent
difficulty in establishing a working definition of the term "executive". As
his judgment indicates, the entire institution of the Canadian Forces may,
in varying degrees, be seen as responsible for the upkeep of discipline and
morale. This could constitute grounds for defining the entire institution
as part of the executive. Carried to its extreme, this notion could require
a permanent and completely autonomous judicial branch within the
Canadian Forces, although Stevenson J. himself acknowledged the
impracticality of this suggestion. To circumvent this issue, Mr. Justice
74. Ibid., at 708.
75. Ibid., at 709. For an explanation of the distinction between administrative and adjudicative
independence, see R. v. Valente (No. 2) (1983), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.) at 432-433.
76. For details, seeR. v. Genereux 114 N.R. 321 (C.M.A.C.) at 372-374. Chief Justice Lamer
noted that process of permitting a Convening Authority (generally an officer superior in rank
to the Commanding Officer of the accused) to decide to prosecute acase [QR&O 's, supra, note
8, art. 111.05], to appoint members to the bench and decide their number and type of tribunal
[QR&O's art. 111.06(1)], and concurrently appoint the prosecutor for trial [QR&O's art.
111.23], is inherently unjust and constitutes an unacceptable breach ofjudicial independence
under the terms of s.1 l(d) of the Charter. He also states that the appointment of the Judge
Advocate by the Judge Advocate General [QR&O's art. 111.22] further undermines the
independence of the tribunal, by nature of the inherently close ties between these positions.
Such appointments shouldbe done by an independentand impartialjudicial officer [as required
under the revised QR&O's arts. 4.09 and 111.22]
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Stevenson applied the reasoning of Dickson C.J.C. (as he then was) in
Beauregard v. R. where the core conceptual value of institutional
independence was defined as "the ability of individual judges to make
decisions ... free from external interference or influence."77 By employ-
ing this rationale, Stevenson J. shared the view of Lamer C.J.C. in holding
that the dual authority of the Convening Authority (which constituted part
of the executive by nature of its significant role in enforcing discipline),
to appoint the bench and prosecution from the same office of the Judge
Advocate General, constituted grounds for a significant and reasonable
appearance of undue influence by the executive, in contravention of
s.II(d) of the Charter.
In her dissent, L'Heureux-Dube J. reiterated her position that it is
unrealistic to expect a separation of the judiciary from the executive
branch of government. To contrast the view offered in Beauregard, she
referred to the judgment of McLachlin J. in MacKeigan v. Hickman
which interprets Beauregard as having contemplated:
not the absolute separation of thejudiciary, in the sense of total absence of
relations from the other branches of government, but separation of its
authority and function. It is impossible to conceive of a judiciary devoid
of any relationship to the legislative and executivebranches of government. 78
This suggests that absolute separation of a tribunal from the executive
is not essential. Instead, a determination as to the sufficiency of institu-
tional independence may be made based on the degree of remoteness
between the executive and judges. Under this analysis, the innate connec-
tion of a Presiding Officer to the Minister of National Defence is
conceded, leaving the issue of a Presiding Officer's institutional indepen-
dence to be determined by a review of the degree of connection between
77. Beauregard v. R., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at 69. Chief Justice Dickson (as he then was)
continued at 69 by stating:
the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence has been the
complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that come before
them: no outsider-be it government, pressure group, individual, or even anotherjudge-
should interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the way in which ajudge conducts
his or her case and makes his or her decision. This core continues to be central to the
principles of judicial independence. [emphasis added]
78. MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796. This view was shared by Chief Justice
Lamer in R. v. Lippe, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114, where it was conceded that this kind of relatively
inconsequential conflict between the judiciary and the executive government necessarily
presented itself in certain situations. The rationale employed to overcome this technical
inconsistency with Valente was the theory that judicial independence was sufficiently met
where the judicial structure was fashioned in a way as to place it beyond the reasonable scope
of government pressure.
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the Presiding Officer and military officials responsible for the prosecu-
tion of the accused.79
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube proceeded from this definition of
institutional independence to argue the legitimacy of the existing process
of appointing a Presiding Officer. Her judgment was based on the
rationality of the disciplinary nexus which inherently governs all mem-
bers of the Canadian Forces, and necessitates the institutionalization of
a command hierarchy which places a Presiding Officer under the purview
of the Minister of National Defence and the executive branch of govern-
ment.80 Consequently, L'Heureux-Dube found that the association be-
tween the military judiciary and the executive was a necessary character-
istic of the military chain of command, which was contemplated by
legislation and sufficiently met the requirement of institutional indepen-
dence under s. I I(d) of the Charter.
It is suggested that the analyses undertaken by Lamer C.J.C. and
Stevenson J. are noncontextual because they do not view the apparatus of
a Court Martial from a military perspective. In contrast, the approach of
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube appears most capable of allowing a
degree of flexibility to be imparted to the structure of Canadian Forces
Court Martials, to accommodate the innate hierarchical command nature
of the armed forces. It is conceded s. 11 (d) of the Charter would likely fail
to support a civilian system where the executive body directly appointed
both prosecution and judicial members. However, this dual-appointment
characteristic reflects the integral hierarchical command structure of the
Canadian Forces which inevitably leads to the Minister of National
Defence and the Governor in Council. In recognition of the nature of
military institutions, and the legislative intent of Parliament to provide a
statutory framework for a structure of Canadian national defence, it is
79. Section 147 NDA [supra, note 6] stipulates restrictions as to who shall not sit as a member
of a General Court Martial:
(a) the officer who convened the court martial;
(b) the prosecutor;
(c) a witness for the prosecution;
(d) the commanding officer of the accused person;
(e) a provost officer (ie. Military Police Officer);
(f) [repealed]
(g) an officer below the rank of captain (naval lieutenant)
(h) any person who prior to the court martial participated in any investigation
respecting the matters upon which a charge against the accused person is founded.
These provisions appear to establish a degree of remoteness between the accused and the bench,
which lends credibility to the assumtion that a Court Martial is an objective tribunal.
80. Section 4 of the NDA empowers the Minister of National Defence with the control and
management of the Canadian Forces, and of all matters relating to national defence.
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submitted that the institutional independence requirement was adequately
met by virtue of the military context in which the Court Martial tribunal
was exercised.
4. Section I of the Charter
Having established that the practice of appointing Presiding Officers to
Canadian Forces General Court Martials violated subsection 11 (d) of the
Charter, Chief Justice Lamer turned in his majority judgment to assess
the possibility of justifying the s. 11 (d) infringement under section 1 of
the Charter. Reverting to the three-part test for Charter-infringement
justification developed by Chief Justice Dickson in the landmark deci-
sion of R. v. Oakes, Lamer C.J.C. proceeded to apply the facts in
Genereux to this analysis. 81
Lamer C.J.C. acknowledged that maintaining a strict disciplinary
regimen within the Canadian Forces constituted a sufficiently substantial
societal objective to satisfy the proportionality arm of the Oakes test. 2
However, he found that the means by which the Canadian Forces sought
to achieve this disciplinary standard gave rise to disproportional Charter
infringements, in relation to the objective of promoting operational
efficiency through the disciplinary adjudication of service offenses by
Court Martials.s3
This finding established that factors surrounding military tribunal
structure of the Canadian Forces failed to demonstrate the necessity of
Charter infringements of the rights of service personnel.
According to Chief Justice Lamer:
It is not necessary, under normal circumstances, to try alleged military
offenders before a tribunal in which thejudge, the prosecutor, and the triers
of fact, are all chosen by the executive to serve at that particular trial. Nor
can it be said to be necessary that promotional opportunities and hence the
financial prospects within the military establishment, for officers serving
on such tribunals should be capable of being affected by senior officers'
assessments of their performance in the course of the trial."
81. R. v. Oakes [1986], 1 S.C.R. 103.
82. Genereux, supra, note I at 150.
83. Despite his ruling, Lamer C.J.C. indicated that the existence of certain extreme conditions
would legitimize such an infringement of a person's Charter rights and freedoms:
I am of the opinion that a trial before a tribunal which does not meet the requirements
of s.1 1(d) of the Charter will only pass the second arm of the proportionality test in
Oakes in the most extraordinary circumstances. A period of war or insurrection might
constitute such circumstances. [emphasis added]
Genereux, supra, note 1 at 150.
84. Ibid.
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Consequently, the scheme of the Canadian Forces General Court
Martial as established at the time of the appellant's trial was held to
unconstitutionally breach the appellant's s. 11 (d) Charter right to appear
at a fair and public hearing by an independent tribunal.
Contrary to this judgment, it is submitted that s.1 of the Charter should
serve to justify the scheme of General Court Martials as a reasonable limit
in a free and democratic society, given the logic of the disciplinary
objective and the reasonableness of implementing military tribunals to
adjudicate service offenses. It is emphasized that service personnel in the
Canadian Forces are accustomed to fair yet stringent dispensations of
justice, and generally view such disciplinary procedures as warranted.
Perhaps, it is fair to conclude that a process which enables the executive
to choose the prosecution, judge, and jury, is inherently inclined against
an accused. However, in view of the Canadian Forces as a military
institution which is most effectively controlled through a regimen of
discipline, it is suggested that such an inclination reasonably conforms
with the character and function of service personnel.
IV. Conclusion
"Discipline is the soul of an army."
General George Washington (1732-1799)
- Letters of instruction to the Captains
of the Virginia Regiments, July 29, 1759
Conventional military doctrine encourages the maintenance of strict
discipline within the ranks of a fighting force.8 This practice optimizes
the exercise of military command and control, which largely contributes
to the success of a military action. In recognition of this basic principle,
Canadian military law holds armed forces personnel accountable to a
special series of statutory provisions designed to maintain a strict stan-
dard of discipline within the Canadian Forces.86 Consequently, enlist-
ment in the Canadian Forces involves submission to a legal jurisdiction
which remains separate and distinctfrom its civilian counterpartby virtue
of its militarily stringent and demanding nature.
The underlying question raised by the anomalous jurisdiction of
Canadian military law is the extent to which a service person may be
85. For details, see Samuel P. Huntington "The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the
Professional Military Ethic" in Malham M. Watkin, ed., War, Morality, and the Military
Profession, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), at 35.
86. For a review, see supra, notes 7 and 8.
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required to sacrifice his/her constitutionally entrenched rights to pursue
a career in the armed forces. This issue was raised in Genereux by the
Supreme Court of Canada in its analysis of existing Canadian Forces
General Court Martial procedures. In deciding an appeal from Corporal
Genereux who challenged the validity of Court Martial tribunals under
s. I l(d) of the Charter, the Supreme Court examined anumber of different
approaches to understand the character and nature of the Canadian Forces
as a national defence military institution. The Court considered the
inherent means by which a military organization carried out its primary
role as a fighting force, and the necessary functional implications which
such a combat role demanded.17 Conversely, the Court also examined the
universality of Charter rights, and the preservation of those fundamental
rights within the operational context of the Canadian Forces." In the
course of balancing these competing values, amajority of the Court found
that the procedures and processes used to adjudicate service offence at
Canadian Forces Court Martials exceeded the parameters which define
one's right to a fair and reasonable trial. Specifically, the Supreme Court
of Canada led by Chief Justice Lamer concluded that Court Martial
tribunals convened by the Canadian Forces were insufficiently indepen-
dent from the executive branch of government to survive Charter
scrutiny under subsection 11 (d).
In structuring a s.l 1(d) Charter review of the juristic fairness embod-
ied in the Canadian Forces Court Martial process, the Court applied its
reasoning expressed by Le Dain J. in Valente. The first of two criteria
established by Valente involved a review of the tribunal on the grounds
of judicial impartiality. This analysis went to determine the degree of
bias harboured by Presiding Officers, who allegedly remained unfairly
pre-disposed towards a strict disciplinary prosecution of military law by
virtue of their command or leadership roles in the Canadian Forces.
Lamer C.J.C., writing for the majority in Genereux, restated a previous
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in MacKay which decided that
a notional existence of limited judicial bias towards strict interpretations
of Canadian Forces statutory provisions was legitimate, in view of the
authoritative command nature of the military hierarchy. 9 This opinion
embraced a contextual interpretation of the Canadian Forces as a unique
national institution which deserved distinct legal status from the main-
stream of Canadian society on account of its role to take up arms for the
87. See supra, note 11.
88. See supra, note 34 and accompanying text.
89. Supra, note 10.
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defence of Canada. This role was found to require a stringent application
of regulations and laws to rigidly enforce a necessarily stringent level of
discipline. Reference was also made to subsection 1 l(f) of the Charter,
which signalled legislative intent that such a perspective, given the
distinct character of the Canadian Forces, was to be adopted and main-
tained. Thus, a contextual and legislative review of the Canadian military
complex supported the legitimate existence of circumscribed judicial
bias at Court Martial tribunals.
The dissenting judgment by L'Heureux-Dube J. in Genereux fully
acknowledged the fundamental necessity of evaluating the conditions
and circumstances surrounding the Canadian Forces before undertaking
a review of its military tribunals. In strongly proposing a contextual
approach to the analysis and evaluation of military regimen factors,
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube went further than Lamer C.J.C. by
proposing that the Court carefully deliberate the operational nature of the
Canadian Forces when reviewing all of the criteria which constitute the
Valente test for judicial fairness under s.11(d) of the Charter. This
opinion demonstrates a valuable awareness of the need for sensitivity to
the issues and underlying rationale of the military infrastructure. Such
understanding would avoid deriving a juristic opinion which could
potentially impose inappropriately "civilian" values upon members of
the Canadian Forces, to the detriment of traditional military principles
which effectively meet the exigencies of warfare. For this reason, it is
submitted that a comprehensive and legitimate review of Court Martials
must begin with a contextual study of the military institution in Canada.
In discussing the necessity of undertaking a contextual assessment of
the Canadian Forces as a legally distinct entity of Canadian society,
L'Heureux-Dube J. found that the criteria of Valente were rendered
inapplicable because of the strictly civilian context envisioned by Le
Dain J. in assessing the impartiality and independence of Provincial
Court judges. The inappropriateness of the this test was apparent when
the Supreme Court of Canada evaluated the independence of a Court
Martial Presiding Officer using the criteria set out in Valente. In consid-
eration of the Valente criteria of security of tenure, and financial
security, a review of Canadian Forces administrative and financial
procedures reveals that such assurances are substantially provided to all
officers by the inherent structure of term-employment contracts used by
the Canadian Forces.
In contrast, Lamer C.J.C. found that security of tenure was not
provided for a Judge Advocate, who was periodically appointed to a
military tribunal on an ad hoe basis as an additional responsibility to his/
her contemporaneous duties with the legal branch of the Judge Advocate
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General's office. As Judge Advocates were appointed by the JAG acting
on behalf of the executive who retained the discretion to re-appoint the
military judges, it was conceivable that a Judge Advocate's ability to be
re-appointed was contingent on the kinds of decisions rendered as a
Presiding Officer. Thus, Lamer C.J.C. saw a reasonable possibility for
undue executive influence.
In support of the judicial appointment system which existed in the
Canadian Forces, L'Heureux-Dube J. argued in her dissent that statutory
provisions for judicial tenure spanning the entire length of any one
particular trial constituted sufficient tenure to meet the requirements of
s. 11 (d) of the Charter, in light of the ad hoc nature of military trials which
arise on an infrequent and irregular basis. This opinion clearly rested on
strong contextual grounds, which recognized that military prosecutions
were only periodically instituted on an ad hoc series of singular occur-
rence trials. In consideration of this fact, an offer of limited tenure on a
case-by-case basis (as then existed) arguably provided a reasonable
means of ensuring judicial independence. The alternative to this scheme
required the implementation and maintenance of a permanent military
judiciary which would inefficiently generate significant collateral spend-
ing on the Canadian Forces, disproportionate to other areas of military
spending in view of the limited scope of responsibility. Madame Justice
L'Heureux-Dube also pointed to a number of statutory safeguards which
appeared to not insignificantly provide tenure for all Presiding Officers.
On this basis, it is argued that the military judicial structure challenged in
Genereux sufficiently maintained an acceptable degree of judicial
independence.
Chief Justice Lamer's main basis for contention lay with the Personal
Evaluation Reports filed by a Presiding Officer's superiors, which
largely determine a Presiding Officer's financial status by defining career
advancement potential to a higher rank. Given that a Presiding Officer's
performance at a Court Martial constituted a military duty which was
subject to evaluation by a superior officer, it was suggested that a
Presiding Officer could have been reasonably motivated to render judi-
cial decisions in accordance with known interests held by his/her superior
officers. Thus, an improperly close association was maintained between
the executive and judicial branches of the Canadian Forces, which could
reasonably lead to an apprehension of undue influence.
In addressing this argument, it is suggested that a number of indepen-
dent factors exist beyond a reviewing officer's ambit of authority. When
viewed together, these factors collectively preclude the existence of a
reasonable apprehension of undue influence being maintained through
the evaluation process. Moreover, a duty to preside over a Court Martial
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is simply one of many responsibilities assumed by a JAG officer in the
exercise of his multi-faceted role as a member of the legal branch.
Consequently, the remoteness between an annual Personal Evaluation
Report and the infrequent performance as a Presiding Officer renders
contentious any apprehension of undue influence.
The important criteria considered by the Court in assessing thejudicial
independence of Court Martials involved a determination of their insti-
tutional independence. This factor was contingent upon the exercise of
Court Martial judicial control over administrative matters which affected
the tribunal's exercise of its adjudicatory functions. By addressing the
extremely close nexus between the prosecutory and judicial functions of
the JAG office, Lamer C.J.C. made a compelling case against the
legitimacy of presiding Judge Advocates by impeaching the sufficiency
of their independence from the prosecution. Overshadowed by the
involvement of superior commanding officers, the methodology of
prosecuting service offenders was held to violate the requirement of
judicial independence under s. 11 (d) of the Charter.
To illustrate the conceptual difficulty in arriving at an agreeable
definition of what constitutes sufficient judicial independence, Mr.
Justice Stevenson described the problems of distinguishing the role of the
executive in the military context. This complication derives from the fact
that the Canadian Forces is a direct extension of the Governor in Council.
A review of the National Defence Act reveals that the Cabinet appointee
holding the portfolio of Minister of National Defence has statutorily
entrenched authority to personally direct the actions of the Canadian
Forces as its commander-in-chief. Within the parameters of the rigidly
observed command hierarchy which characteristically reflects the mili-
tary nature of an armed force, a descending leadership influence from the
executive permeates all areas and levels of the Canadian Forces.
Pursuant to this concept of executive influence, it is submitted that a
theoretically absolute separation of military tribunals from the executive
is inconsistent with the nature of the Canadian Forces. Instead, executive
influence is a necessary characteristic of the military chain of command,
and was contemplated by Parliament when it devised statutory provisions
to accommodate a degree of judicial independence for military tribu-
nals.90 By nature of their status as service personnel, Presiding Officers
are necessarily subject to the command and control of military superiors
who hold their authority from executive decrees. To suggest that this
90. Supra, note 45.
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process is improper goes to criticize the concept of permitting democrati-
cally-elected politicians to govern the military institution. It further
attacks the concept of creating military tribunals to prosecute service
offenses as disciplinary actions within the operational context of the
military environment.
Returning to Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube's contextual analysis
theory in applying s.1 1(d) of the Charter to review the legitimacy of
military tribunals, it is suggested that the exigencies of the Canadian
Forces necessitate a marginal infringement of an accused's Charter
rights before aCourt Martial. Contrary to the majority judgment of Lamer
C.J.C. which rejected this framework and denied the ability of s.1 of the
Charter to permit such a breach as a necessary and demonstrably justified
practice, itis submitted that an acceptance of this military structure would
more realistically accommodate the competing concerns before the
Court. Namely, this option balances the need to extend fundamental
Charter rights to all Canadians irrespective of their occupation/profes-
sion, against the compelling practical requirement of preserving an
effective command hierarchy to fulfil operational requisites of military
doctrine and combat.
Thereal issue in Genereux and the major theme of this paper questions
the appropriateness of maintaining a separate legal structure to govern
members of the Canadian Forces. From a public policy perspective, the
appropriateness of employing the Supreme Court of Canada as a forum
for making such a determination is questionable, particularly in light of
the need to evaluate the military as a unique and fundamental Canadian
institution deserving special status. In a much narrower sense, it is
submitted that the prosecution of service offenses by Court Martial is a
legitimateexercise of the disciplinary review mechanism of the Canadian
Forces, which lends objectivity andfairness to the process by virtue of the
tribunal's comprehensive level of service knowledge. In many respects,
this virtue could prove to be a fairer mechanism for imposing justice than
could be achieved by a civilian tribunal. This fact was generally recog-
nized and acknowledged in all three Supreme Court judgments in
Genereux, although each judgment varied in its willingness to allow the
Canadian Forces wider or narrower latitude in defining an ambit of
legitimacy to discipline its members.
Ultimately, an opinion of the fairness imparted by a Court Martial
revolves around one's perception of how differently members of the
Canadian Forces should be treated from the rest of society, in pursuit of
rigid disciplinary standards which contrast established civilian legal
norms. In all likelihood, this contentious debate will continue in various
political or legal forms. Regardless, it is hoped that Presiding Officers at
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military tribunals will continue to exercise balanced discretion to support
the legitimacy and fairness of these disciplinary proceedings. It is also
hoped that future judicial or statutory challenges against the inherent
disciplinary mechanism of the Canadian Forces will be reviewed from a
contextual perspective. This would guard against the possibility that the
functional command nature of the Canadian Forces could become di-
luted, whereupon its ability to successfully maintain a military campaign
would be compromised.
